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Immanuel Kant and Georg Simmel on fashion Georg Simmel's idea of formal sociology was, in many ways, influenced by his reading of Immanuel Kant's aesthetic writings, and Critique of Judgement Power in particular (see Frisby 1992 and Davies 1972).
Less attention has been paid to the fact that many of Simmel's essays on various social phenomena can also be understood and read as extended commentaries on Kant's ideas or suggestions -often not forming any essential part of Kant's own thinking and mentioned only in passing. This, in particular, is the case with Simmel's famous essay(s) on fashion.' Immanual Kant made a short comment on the significance of fashion in his writing on anthropology (Kant 1980 (Kant (1798 :571-572), but obviously this social phenomenon was not considered to be worth any extensive treatment. Kant's ideas cannot be said to be very original either. Rather, he shared an attitude towards fashion common among learned men of his time (cf. Gadamer 1975:34).
Kant discussed fashion in the context of taste. According to him, fashion has nothing to do with genuine judgements of taste (Geschmacksurteil), but is a case of unreflected and 'blind' imitation. As such it is the opposite of 'good taste'. It stems only from human vanity and social competition in which men t2y to get the better of each other and improve their social standing. Still, it is interesting to note that Kant shared Simmel's opinion that it is far better to try to follow fashion than to try to avoid ?:) Scandinavian Sociological Association. 1993 or totally neglect it -an effort as futile as it is impossible ('Besser ist es aber doch immer, ein Narr in der Mode als ein Narr ausser der Mode zu sein' (Kant 1980:572) ). As Kant also already knew, fashions are transitory -otherwise they would be transformed into traditions. Fashion regulates only things that could just as well be otherwise or, as Herbert Blumer put it, 'the pretended merit or value of the competing models cannot be demonstrated through open and decisive tests' (Blumer 1969:286 ; see also Gadamer 1975:34) . It is, moreover, the principle of novelty which enlivens fashion and lends it its special charm (Kant 1980:572) .
There is, however, no hint in Kant's treatment of fashion to suggest that he would have thought its social significance to be anywhere near as important as Simmel later thought it to be. To Simmel, fashion helped to overcome the distance between an individual and his society, and it was a phenomenon of modernity par excellence (Simmel shared Baudelaire's idea about fashion as 'contingent, transitory and fugitive' (cf. Frisby 1985:40-41)). It is, however, useful to read Simmel's essays on fashion as critical commentaries on Kant's Critique of Judgement Power, or rather ironic comments on his ideas about taste and beauty. Fashion is a living antinomy: it does not have to make up its mind whether to be or not to be, because it can both be and not be at the same time (Simmel 1983b:47) .
As Colin Campbell (1987) suggested. there is an important affinity between fashion and taste. Fashion can be understood as a defacto solution to the main -and theoretically unsolvable -problem inherent in the aesthetics of taste of the 18th century. Fashion offers a socially valid standard of taste which is only based on the individual preferences and choices of the members of the 'community of tastes'. In order to avoid misunderstandings, it should be pointed out that fashion obviously does not share the ideal, and in a sense exemplary, character of 'good taste', but still it can be said to be equally binding or obliging in relation to the individuals concerned (see Gronow 1993 ; see also Gadamer 1975:35) . In the most general terms, it can be said to form a universal standard of taste which, however, allows for the singularity and subjectivity of individual tastes.
As a matter of fact, there is strong evidence that Simmel was aware of this parallel, even though he did not formulate it in quite the same terms or quite as explicitly.
Simmel's analysis of social formations was often aimed at showing how they all offer -at best -provisional societal solutions to a problem which, in his opinion, was obviously the main problem facing modern man. Sociology could thus directly make an invaluable contribution to the philosophy of life. In 'The Metropolis and the Mental Life ' (1950 (1903) :423),' Grosstadt' (read: modern society) offered an ideal arena for the two principal ways -in principle always fighting with each other -of allocating roles to men. According to the first principle, all men are equal and they share a common substance of humanity, whereas the second principle dictates that every man is a unique being and irreplaceable as such. Both principles are logically exclusive -and still their opposition is overcome daily in modem society. In the same way. fashion is a societal formation always combining two opposite principles. It is a socially acceptable and secure way to distinguish oneself from others and, at the same time, it satisfies the individual's need for social adaptation and imitation:
Fashion is the imitation of a given example and satisfies the demand for social adaptation: it leads the individual along the road which all travel. it furnishes a general condition. which resolves the conduct of every individual into a mere example. At the same time it modifies to no lesser degree the need for differentiation. the tendency towards dissimilarity, the desire for change and contrast on the one hand by a constant change of contents ... (Simmel 19X1 ( 1904) :&-7) In Simmel's opinion it was, in fact, Immanuel Kant in his Critiqe of Judgement Power who, more clear-sightedly and more profoundly than any other before him, had formulated this great problem facing every modern individual. Kant's aesthetics show how it is possible for the individual to be genuinely free and autonomous without degenerating into a state of isolation and lawlessness:
In any case, it is one of the first and one of the most profound attempts of reconciliation in the aesthetic sphere between the indispensable individual subjectivity of the modem man and the equally necessary overindividual community. (Simmel 1905b :168-169; trans. J.G.)
As Simmel tried to show in great detail, the modem fashion pattern constitutes a social formation which operates like an overindividual scheme through which an individual can express his loyality to and strengthen his social ties with the 'norms of his time' without losing his 'inner freedom' (see Simmel 1983b:57). Expressed in the most general terms: 'Two social tendencies are essential to the establishment of fashion, namely, the need of union on the one hand and the need of isolation on the other' (Simmel 1981:8).
The antinomy of taste
As Howard Caygill has recently shown (1989), in writing his Critique of Judgement Power Kant confronted two parallel traditions of European thought of the 18th century: German 'Polizeiwissenschaft', represented by Christian Wolff and practised by Frederick the Great who thought that the state should legislate the happiness of its citizens, and British empiricist aesthetics, who left the decisions concerning the goodness and the beauty to the private judgements of the members of the civil society. In presenting his famous antinomy Kant tried both to unite and to overcome these two traditions which can be understood to be dealing with exactly the type of questions emerging from Simmel's reading of Kant. Aesthetics was by no means understood to be dealing in any very straightforward manner with a political question. Still, the opposition between individual autonomy and social order could not only be discussed but was obviously also thought to be felt and experienced in the most touching form in the aesthetic sphere.
The old saying 'De gustibus disputandum non est' did not originally mean that every man had a taste of his own which was of no concern to others. On the contrary, matters of taste were thought to be self-evident and judgements of taste, at least in principle. generally shared by all. There could thus be no reason or grounds for arguing about them. A false judgement of taste was caused either by ignorance or error. According to this interpretation, judgements of taste concerning the beauty of objects were ultimately based on feelings of pleasure and displeasure: what felt good was both right and beautiful (see Hooker 1934 and Campbell 1987) .
In these discussions, the physiological or gustatory sense of taste often acted as a model for the aesthetic judgement of taste. As Dr. Armstrong wrote in 1702: 'As of beef and port, judge for yourself, and report of wit.' In particular, making judgements of taste, and distinguishing beauty from ugliness, was as self-evident and easy as telling salt from sugar. As Edmund Burke (1987 Burke ( (1857 ) quite seriously claimed in his treatise concerning the beautiful and the sublime, which was probably the bestknown work on aesthetics during the 18th century, once the possibility of mistake had been overruled, only a fool could fail to make the proper judgement.
The representatives of this tradition, for example Hume, Hutcheson and Addison, were by no means so naive as to think that people's choices and preferences actually tended to converge. On the contrary. even people of similar origin were seldom seen to agree on their judgements. Good taste was a 'Bildungsbegriff. It was something which, at least potentially, could be shared by all in spite of their social origins, even though it had to be admitted that its proper exercise demanded practice and the presence of suitable examples to be followed. And practice obviously demanded time. Thus, in practice, only men of considerable wealth could be expected to show good taste in their daily manners (cf. Thorstein Veblen's (1961 (1899)) critique of the aesthetic standards of the 'leisure class' at the turn of the present century; see also Bourdieu's (1984) like-minded critique of Kantian aesthetics as the aesthetics of a ruling class).
Still, the revolutionary nature of the standard of 'good taste' should not be forgotten. For the first time, it was now possible to think that all human beings had similar taste: the hunger of a king did not, in principle, differ from the hunger of a beggar.
There was a problem inherent in the tradition from the beginning, of which its representatives were only partly aware. This was explicitly formulated first by Kant. How could something which was exclusively based on the subjective feeling of pleasure (see Kant 1966 Kant (1790 :?31) be universally valid too? The feeling of beauty requires that it be shared universally. As the antinomy was formulated by Kant, both the following positions are equally plausible and defendable, and yet they cannot both be true at the same time: (1) everyone has a taste of his own ('Ein jeder hat seinen eigenen Geschmack') and (2) one cannot argue over matters of taste ('Uber den Geschmack lasst sich nicht disputieren').
According to Kant's definition of (pure aesthetic) taste, it is the ability to judge or choose in a universally valid way (allge- Kant emphasized time after time that this subjective universality had nothing to do with the empirical generality of a belief or a preference ('Since a judgment of taste is in fact of this sort, its universal validity is not to be established by gathering votes and asking other people what kind of sensations they are having' (Kant 1987:?31) ). The fact that something is generally liked does not justify our calling it beautiful. The universality of aesthetic judgements which Kant had in mind is of another kind altogether. In his opinion, we should be equally careful not to blend genuine aesthetic, (disinterested) pleasure with sensual pleasure: it is, in principle, a different matter to say that one likes oysters than to say that Titian's painting is beautiful.
Kant's community of united tastes
As Kant pointed out, in presenting an aesthetic judgement, despite the fact that it is ultimately based only on our subjective feelings, we cannot avoid expecting others to join our appreciation of the object of beauty. Otherwise, the judgement would not be a The idea of a 'Gemeinsinn' obviously gets some support from the fact that we are indeed able to communicate both our knowledge and our feelings (Kant 1966:21 
Fashion and taste
As has already been pointed out, if asked, Kant -and Lyotard -would certainly hasten to add that this kind of a 'non-existent' consensus or harmony of feelings has absolutely nothing to do with the universality of fashion, which is always 'only' empirical by nature. Still, Simmel's characterization of the fashion pattern includes features resembling, to an amazing extent, Kant's idea of sensus communis as interpreted by Lyotard:
The kind of concensus implied by such a process. if there is any concensus at all, is in no way argumentative but is rather allusive and elusive. endowed with a special way of being alive. combining both life and death, . It never actually exists. 'To be in fashion' is constantly being transformed into being 'out of fashion'. There is a tendency towards universalism inherent in every fashion, but this tendency can never be fully realised. As soon as a fashion permeates everything, it stops being a fashion:
As soon as the example has been universally adopted, that is. as soon as anything that was originally done only by a few has really come to be practised by all -as is the case in certain portions of our apparel and in various forms of social conduct -we no longer speak of fashion. As fashion spreads. it gradually goes to its doom . . . fashion includes a peculiar attraction of limitation. the attraction of simultaneous beginning and end ... (Simmel 1981:9).
As has already been pointed out, Colin Campbell has suggested that fashion should be understood as a practical solution to a problem inherent in 18th century aesthetics of taste. Fashion first formed the soughtafter aesthetic community: Fashion became the de facto answer to the problem which none of the eighteenth-century wnters on taste would solve; that is, how to find a commonly agreed, aesthetic standard which, while catering for people's real preferences, could also continue to serve as the basis for an ideal of character. These writers, whilst perceiving the need for such a standard. had understandably assumed that it would be based upon universal and unchanging rules; the sociological necessity, arising out of the form of modern hedonism, demanded change. (Campbell 1987 It is, however, a different thing to say that people enjoy fashionable consumer goods because of the feeling of novelty associated with them, than to claim that they consciously make use of them in order to promote their own social standing. It is also a different thing to say that fashion has consequences for social stratification than to claim that individuals consciously make use of objects of fashion in order to climb up the social ladder. Nor is it always clear whether Simmel had in mind the first or the second process or mechanism.
Class fashion or mass fashion?
Simmel's essay has dominated much of the sociological discussion about fashion up to now to such an extent that Herbert Blumer By virtue of style, the particularity of the individual work is subjugated to a general law of form that also applies to other works; it is. so to speak. relieved of its absolute autonomy. Because it shares its nature or a part of its design with others it thus points to a common root that lies beyond the individual work . . . However, Simmel's concept of style differs from Luhmann's in one important respect: Simmel thought that genuine works of art cannot share a common style (see Simmel 1985) . Only works of applied art (arts and crafts) or designed products can have a style. In Simmel's words, 'instead of the character of individuality, applied art is supposed to have the character of style, of broad generality . . .' (see Simmel 1991:67). Because objects of applied art are always meant to be used. they cannot be unique. They already have something in common: they all serve a specific useful purpose and satisfy a need that is common to many men (see Simmel 1991:65).
Simmel quite obviously would not have wanted to deny the usefulness of the concept of style in art history. He must have been well aware of the common use of the concept of style which had become established in the middle of the 18th century. His own concept of style, however, is more ambitious. In some respects it comes closer to the older concept of 'maniera' traditionally designating the way to make things (see Link-Heer 1986). In order to share a common style, objects of applied art -or any objects -must have been produced in a special manner: they must be stylized. Genuine works of art, on the other hand, can never be stylized, otherwise they would lose their uniqueness and individuality. One could then perhaps venture to say that 'style', to Simmel, is something more than a mere thought abstraction. It is a 'Realabstraktion'.
What makes Simmel's discussion of style sociologically interesting is the fact that he draws a direct parallel between the style of objects of use and life-style. In his opinion, in the same way as one can speak of a personal fashion (see Simmel 1981:13-14), one can also speak of a personal style. Such a personal style is, however, a borderline case, the possibility of which is reserved only for strong personalities (like Goethe). We common folk have to be satisfied with something far less ambitious. An attempt to try to surround oneself with objects with a strong personal flavour of their own would only end in total stylelessness (see also Noro The only difference that remains is the fact that art does not tolerate copies, whereas copies make a fashion even more striking (see Luhmann 1986:656). Once the world of art is abandoned and the styles in applied art or of consumer goods are considered, the difference is of no consequence. In producing consumer goods, models are copied and style is something that characterizes the unifying features of both the copies and their original models.
Conclusion
Simmel's analysis of fashion -read through the critical eyes of both Kant and Blumerhas taught us how a person can be a homogeneous part of a mass without losing his individuality -or how he can both stick to his own private taste and expect otherswho also have a taste of their own -to share it. For him, however, all such solutions to the conflict between the principles of individuality and sociability are only provisional. Social harmony is never within reach. As Lyotard said the community of the United Tastes is only a 'cloud of a community'. The bridge crossing the gap between the individual and his society has to be built over and over again. In Simmel's opinion, the concept of style should be reserved only for the objects of design. Objects of art are always unique. Otherwise, Simmel's and Luhmann's conceptions of style do not differ from each other: in the modern society of mass consumption, in particular, they are functional equivalents. The concept of style has, however, more to do with the characterization of the objects of consumption, whereas fashion characterizes the whole social pattern of distinction and adaptation. The only thing that Georg Simmel would probably consider somewhat strange in the above quotation would be its slightly moralizing overtone. He would probably be tempted to remind the reader that 'the difference appearing at the level of symbolic culture' is just as real and important a characteristic of modern consumer culture as its 'underlying' uniformity. In consuming goods people are both expressing their own aesthetic preferences and sharing a collective taste with others. 2 As Simmel (1983b:42) already knew, once fashions are created by a fashion industry -as they undoubtedly are in a modern commercial society -objects are produced with the very purpose of becoming fashionable. According to a standard critical argument. the feelings of pleasure and displeasure of the consumer then become more or less totally manipulated and their genuine choices and preferences no longer play any significant role in the formation of this social process. To Simmel, on the other hand. it only proved that the social form of fashion had become totally indifferent to its specific contents. The overindividuality of this form even set its label on its contents. In such a conception of fashion there is, however. a more interesting critical element, which was also expressed by Simmel. There is a danger that the objective social formation of fashion becomes so overwhelming that it suppresses the very subjectivity of the individual. Thus, the increasing disproportion between objective and subjective cultures comes into appearance in fashion too. 
